Abstract:In this paper we analyze the interplay between access to the last-mile network and net neutrality in the market for Internet access. We consider two Internet service providers (ISPs), which act as platforms between Internet users and content providers (CPs). One of the ISPs is vertically integrated and provides access to its last-mile network to the other (non-integrated) ISP. We show that a lower access price increases the integrated ISP's incentives to charge CPs positive termination fees (i.e., to deviate from net neutrality), and decreases the non-integrated ISP's incentives to charge positive termination fees.

Presenter: Romain Lestage is an assistant professor at Central University of Finance and Economics, School of Management Science and Engineering. His main research interests are applied microeconomics, industrial organization, Internet, telecommunications, and Medias.

Co-author: Marc Bourreau. Professor at Telecom Paris, Department of Economics and Social Sciences; Research associate at CREST, Industrial Economics Lab

Time：1:30-2:30 p.m, December 11th,2013

Place：Room1206,Teaching Building,

School of Management Science and Engineering.

[编辑]：孙颖