主讲人： 钟笑寒

摘要：In this paper, we address empirically the issue how unfair match between colleges and students would affect the long-run efficiency of the college admission system, measured by total wage level among college graduates. Using data from China College Student Survey, we find that unfair match tends to increase the total wage level. The implication is that student ability and school quality are substitutes rather than complements, at least among unfairly matched students. We also find evidence that unfair match leads to higher total human capital investment on English skill, leadership, and double major, but not on high GPA. We interpret this finding as unfair match, by increasing the ability inequality within a college, encourages diversified human capital investment instead of monotonic competition, which indicates possible channels of efficiency improvement. (Xiaohan Zhongand Lin Zhu, JEL Codes: C7; D61; D63; I21).

关于主讲人： 钟笑寒，清华大学经济管理学院副教授，经济系系主任。研究领域包括劳动经济学、政治经济学、应用微观经济学、应用微观理论,其论文发表在国际顶级期刊《Games and Economic Behavior》等，中文论文发表于《中国社会科学》、《经济学季刊》等期刊。

时间：2017年3月15日星期三14:00-15:30

地点：学术会堂南楼608室

主办单位：人力资本与劳动经济研究中心

[编辑]：张萌