讲座人： 郑登津

讲座主题：Incentive Alignment and Corporate Tax Avoidance: Evidence from a Natural Experiment

摘要：Using the Split-Share Structure Reform in China as an exogenous shock to incentive alignment, we find that a better alignment of incentives between corporate insiders and minority shareholders positively affects corporate tax avoidance. While a better alignment of incentives increases low risk tax planning, it has no significant impact on high risk tax avoidance or illegal tax avoidance decisions. Consistent with the idea that firms in greater need for cash will engage in more tax avoidance, we find that the effect of incentive alignment on corporate tax avoidance is stronger for firms facing more pronounced financial constraints. The results are stronger for non-state owned enterprises than for state-owned enterprises. Finally, the results are robust to a variety of tests run to mitigate identification concerns.

讲座时间：2016年12月21日，周三，15:30开始

讲座地点：学院南路主教10楼1011

讲座人简介：郑登津，清华大学博士研究生。研究方向为公司治理、会计和资本市场等，已在《管理世界》、《会计研究》、《中国工业经济》、《审计研究》、《中国会计评论》和《China Journal of Accounting Studies》等期刊发表多篇学术论文。

[编辑]：张萌