主题：Bank Loan Reliance and Inflation Inattention

报告人：齐正华，香港科技大学博士生

摘要：Utilizing merged Italian firm-level administrative and survey data, we provide causal evidence that firms heavily reliant on bank loans are better informed about inflation and make smaller forecast errors. We also show that financing composition affects how firms learn from new information with randomized control trials. To explain these findings, we develop a partial equilibrium model featuring rational inattention where firms become more attentive when their financing costs are sensitive to aggregate inflation. Inflation impacts the relative cost of external versus internal funding, leading firms to adjust their investment, capital structure, and attention allocation. This mechanism, in combination with the heterogeneous financing structure across firms, generates dispersion in inflation expectations, replicating the empirical evidence. A novel policy implication of our model is that the aggressiveness of monetary policy toward inflation stabilization affects the degree of monetary non-neutrality through the firms’ attention allocation channel and resulting inflation expectations.

报告人简介：齐正华，香港科技大学博士生，她的研究领域包括宏观经济学，货币经济学和公司金融，目前研究项有限理性和公司动态等课题。

时间：2025年3月12日（周三）11:30-13:00

地点：356体育官方网站学院南路校区学术会堂712会议室

主办单位：创新发展学院中国经济与管理研究院