讲座人：卢近知（Jinzhi Lu）

摘要：I develop a model to study the implications of limited attention on financial reporting. I first shed light on a fundamental trade-off between disclosing asummary versus disclosing details: although a summary contains less information about fundamentals than details, it is easier to process. Moreover, I findthat when investors' decisions are complements, reporting details together with asummary does not always dominate reporting a summary alone. The main reasonfor this surprising result is that when investors care about the decisions of others,they are induced to process details, even if doing so is very costly. By uncoveringa potential cost of reporting details, my paper contributes a novel insight into theconsequence of providing detailed information, an issue that is currently beingconsidered by the FASB in its performance disaggregation project.

讲座时间：2019年3月20日，周三，17:10-18:10

讲座地点：学院南路学术会堂604

讲座人简介：卢近知，来自芝加哥大学布斯商学院（University of Chicago Booth School of Business）。

[编辑]：张萌